HIMALAYA, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and
Himalayan Studies
Volume 25
Number 1 Himalaya No. 1 & 2

Article 21

2005

Book review of 'Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical
Culture: An Ethnomethodological Inquiry into Formal Reasoning'
by Kenneth Liberman
D. Phillip Stanley
Naropa University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya

Recommended Citation
Stanley, D. Phillip. 2005. Book review of 'Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture: An
Ethnomethodological Inquiry into Formal Reasoning' by Kenneth Liberman. HIMALAYA 25(1).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol25/iss1/21

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the DigitalCommons@Macalester College at
DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association
for Nepal and Himalayan Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
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C ULTURE : AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL I NQUIRY
INTO FORMAL R EASONING
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In the foreward to the book, the initiator of
ethnomethodology, Harold Garfinkel , praises
Liberman's application of his methodology to Tibetan
monastic debate as an "exceptional ethnography"
of "reason in its lived , embodied, choreographed
exhibits of organization al Things in the details" that
"makes it p ossible to ask perspicuous, sociological
questions ab out the local organization al work of
formal reasoning" (ix-x). Liberman describes his
approach as "philosophical anthropology" (296), by
which he mea ns an "exh austive microsociological
account" (27 ) of the living philosophica l practices
of a community.
Liberman asserts that lndologists and Tibetologists have ignored "almost entirely the life-world
of Tibetan scholars," due to their focus on the
philological analysis of texts. They thus " remain
in capable of comprehending, with anything like a
basic sociologica l adequacy, South Asian or Tibetan
philosophical p ractice as lived traditions" (3, ita lics
in the original) . He argues that the social practices
involved in debate play a central role in the emergence of philosophical insights. He notes that "logic
and reason are devices that assist the philosophers
in their social task of organizing a philosophical inquiry. .. . It is only within a context constituted by the
forms of social interaction .. .that one can begin to attemp t to di ssociate a propositional formulation from
those activities .. .. That formal reasoning becomes
transcendental is a social as well as a philosophical
phenomenon" (85). He observes that "social amnesia" regarding the communal roots of philosophical

insight enables the obj ectification of insights such
th at they rise to transce ndent truths applicable to all
times and places (p. 104-105).
Regarding Tibetan debate, Liberman observes th at
the "employment of absurd consequences ... lends to
Tibetan philosophical discourse a certain Oavor of
irony, and Tibetan argumentation can become very
humorous." He highlights the "playfulness with
which Tibetan philosophers entertain ironies" (189).
For instance, he desc ribes a debate in which it h as
come to light that "there can b e a person who accepts
profound theses as true and so is a proper member
of his school of philosophical tenets, yet fails to realize their true import" (191). He describes how "By
this time the defenders are in full celebrati on of this
irony and the insight into the philosopher's life that
it bears, and so they sustain the patent absurdity .. .
just wonderfully proposed " b y the challenger (19 1).
Liberman identifies the emergence of such insights
as "the acme of Geluk philosophical practice" ( 19 1).
He proposes that the goa l of debate is not simply to
formall y expose a contradiction in the thinking of
another but to " bring it to life in front of the thinkers" (181 , italics in original). He states that 'T he pith
of the Tibetan dialectical sys tem is to be continually placing every philosophical system at risk" (58)
and h e praises the "rea l world creativity of thinkers
working with , thro ugh , and 'beyond ' the [logical!
forms" (p . 263).
Such statements describe the debate practice at its
b est and m ay appear na1ve out of context. Liberman notes that there are sch olars who have severely

criticized the Tibetan debate tradition. For example, he cites
one scholar's depiction of debate as the "slavish pursuit of
formali stic argumentation according to the scripts set forth
in the yig cha [the manuals of one's monastic college)" (266).
While Liberman acknowledges the ever present potential for
sterility and sophistry in debate, he takes issue with such
characterizations as one-sided. He proposes instead a more
balanced picture. For example, he stresses the role of rhetorical moves in debate, both in their positive use to accentuate
substantial insights as well as in their negative "diabolical"
(75) use for sheer sophistry to "win" a debate . These rhetorical
moves include vague evasive responses by defendants, misrepresentations of a defendant's statements by the challenger,
bluffing, ridicule, formal cl aims of contradiction when none
have occurred, stalls and digressions, verbal harassment,
derisive laughter, accusative vocal gestures ("Ahaaah! "), "a ntagonistic wrappings and twirlings of the challenger's rosary"
(76), and so on.
Liberman shows considerable insight into the performative aspects of debate. He appreciates the aesthetics of the
skillful enactment of the forms of debate, the pleasing union
of elocution, bodily movements, and logical content. He
highlights the elegance, rhythm, dignity, the synchronized
choreography, verbal pirouettes, rhythmic overlaps, rhymes,
and speaking-as-one of challengers and defenders as they
work together. Such qualities come and go within specific
debates. When they arise, they may be accompanied by significant content or not, but in either case they add to the
appeal of debate. Liberman notes that "Tibetan debaters work
deliberately to direct these energies into a well synchronized,
smoothly flowing course of dialectics. When the dialectics
is going well, the energies are flowing freely and there is a
synergy that is brought to their intellectual concerns" (217).
These qualities can be seen in the CD that accompanies the
book and provides a visual and auditory record of all the
debates that he analyzes .
Liberman acknowledges the dangers of setting forth the
tremendous detail involved in applying ethnomethodology to
debate. He writes:

In Garfinkel's terms, such local work consists of 'the holy
hellish concreteness of Lhings.'... [O]ne becomes swamped by
the detail s ... A seriou s risk is whether any audience will have
the interest or the patience to lea rn such a level of detail. But
there is no alteni.ative but to try to make one's way through
what Bar-Hillel calls 'the jungle of daily discourse'." (37)
Much of the book proceeds by means of detailed analysis
of sma ll portions of various debates. Many readers will likely
find a good portion of the debates intelligible, especially if
they put effort into learning the rudiments of Tibetan debate
set forth in the book. Tibetan debate tends to be laconic so
that the meaning or a specific debate term at a specific point
in a debate may still not be fully clear to a given reader. Fortunately, one can appreciate Liberman's numerous insights
without going through all the debates. He has a distinctive
way of translating the formal debate language into English.
The result is somewhat awkward but this is at least in part
due to the formal nature of debate language. Nonetheless, his
usages are intelligible and consistent. (On a minor note, there
are a number of typos in his transliterations of the Tibetan
terminology: gsel should be gsal (68), rte should be of ste
(88), etc.)
In summary, Liberman's critique of the neglect of the lived
social practice of the Tibetan tradition by textually-oriented
Tibetologists and Indologists is to the point, though he has
not adequately dealt with how the textual tradition has served
as a powerful, conservative, constraining influence on debate. He also provides a welcome corrective to one-sided critiques of debate. He reveals the creative, probing, insightful
dimensions of debate as well as its aesthetic appeal. He also
artfully communicates how this social practice of debate can
be a personally compelling, even transformative endeavor for
the monk-scholars involved, while also noting its potential
for sophistic misuse or rote shallow engagement. The book
thus presents a balanced analysis of the socially embedded
practices of Tibetan debate.
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